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INTRODUCTION 
ince the end of the United States Supreme Court’s “Lochner era” in 
1936, federal and state legislators have had unbridled authority to 
regulate economic matters in the United States. Having determined that 
the legislature is the arm of government best-suited to make such reg-
ulatory decisions, the Supreme Court announced that constitutionally 
challenged economic legislation would be subjected to the most deferen-
tial standard of judicial review.1 On the international stage—particularly 
in the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2007—one would 
expect judicial deference toward socioeconomic regulation to be a fore-
gone conclusion. However, the United Nations Human Rights Commit-
tee (the “Committee”) has actually harked back to a brand of judicial 
scrutiny reminiscent of the Lochner era, having recently condemned  
certain types of public interest legislation as incompatible with inter-
national equal protection.2 
The Human Rights Committee was established after the entry into 
force of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) in 1976 and is now the primary international body charged 
with monitoring the implementation of this important human rights  
treaty.3 Meeting regularly in Geneva and New York, the Committee is 
comprised of 18 individual experts reviewing formal complaints of inter-
national human rights violations and rendering responsive opinions 
(known as “views”) under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.4 Since its 
inception, the Committee has amassed a substantial body of recommen-
                                                                                                             
 1. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[L]egislation 
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional  
unless[,] in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed[,] it is of such a  
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”). 
 2. See infra Part I.A. 
 3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, open for signature Dec. 19, 
1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. For a compre-
hensive account of the judgments, see MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY (2d rev. ed. 2005); Nisuke Ando, The Evolution 
and Problems of the Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee’s Views Concerning 
Article 26, in TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 205, 205–24 (Nisuke 
Ando ed., 2004); Tufyal Choudhury, Interpreting the Right to Equality Under Article 26 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 8 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 24 
(2003); Christian Tomuschat, The Human Rights Committee’s Jurisprudence on Article 
26 – A Pyrrhic Victory?, in TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 225, 
225–43 (Nisuke Ando ed., 2004). 
 4. Human Rights—Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee, 
HUMAN RIGHTS FACT SHEET NO. 15 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee, New York, N.Y.), May 
2005, at 12–14. 
S 
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dations, and several have dealt with the principle of nondiscrimination.5 
It has been in this context that the Committee’s recommendations bear 
resemblance to Lochner era adjudication. 
The principle of nondiscrimination prohibits any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction, or preference that is based on any grounds, such as race,  
color, or other identifiable individual or group distinctions.6 Most early 
cases before the Committee concerned claims of narrowly defined dis-
crimination in the enjoyment of civil and political rights under the 
ICCPR, but more recently, the Committee has reviewed a broader range 
of disputes involving social and economic legislation.7 Recent views 
have demonstrated the Committee’s willingness to expand the meaning 
of “equal protection” under the ICCPR, and, given the subject matter 
underlying the disputes in question, there is reason to believe the Com-
mittee will find issues of equal protection increasingly relevant to the 
propriety of certain types of socioeconomic legislative measures in the 
                                                                                                             
 5. See Karakurt v. Austria (Communication No. 965/2000), reprinted in U.N. Hum. 
Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 304, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (Jan. 1, 
2002) [hereinafter Karakurt v. Austria]; Des Fours Walderode v. Czech Republic (Com-
munication No. 747/1997), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human 
Rights Committee, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (Jan. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Des Fours Wal-
derode v. Czech Republic]; Vos v. Netherlands (Communication No. 786/1997), reprinted 
in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 271, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/40 (Jan. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Vos v. Netherlands]; Adam v. Czech Republic (Com-
munication No. 586/1994), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human 
Rights Committee, at 165, U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (May 17, 1997) [hereinafter Adam v. Czech 
Republic]; Simunek v. Czech Republic (Communication No. 516/1992), reprinted in U.N. 
Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 89, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 
(Jan. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Simunek v. Czech Republic]; Pepels v. Netherlands (Commu-
nication No. 484/1991), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human 
Rights Committee, at 221, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (Sept. 21, 1994) [hereinafter Pepels v. 
Netherlands]; Pauger v. Austria (Communication No. 415/1990), reprinted in U.N. Hum. 
Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 325, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (Oct. 9, 
1992) [hereinafter Pauger v. Austria]; Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands (Communication 
No. 182/1984), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Com-
mittee, at 160, U.N. Doc. A/42/40 (Aug. 28, 1987) [hereinafter Zwaan-de Vries v. Nether-
lands]. 
 6. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee: General Com-
ment No. 18, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (Nov. 11, 1989) [hereinafter General Comment No. 
18]. 
 7. This development began in 1987 when the Committee dealt with gender discrim-
ination in socio-economic legislation. See Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5. 
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future.8 Thus far, the Committee has already applied rigorous scrutiny to 
such measures.9 
While the Committee’s jurisprudential ideology differs from the  
laissez-faire capitalism of the Lochner Court—it aims instead to protect 
the interests of disadvantaged citizens—their standard of judicial scrutiny 
is similarly demanding.10 As a result, the Committee has deemed a num-
ber of laws incompatible with international human rights and the 
ICCPR.11 Though the efforts of the Human Rights Committee to enhance 
equality on the international level are well-intentioned, these efforts may 
have a chilling effect on the future enactment of important socioeconomic 
legislation. Socioeconomic legislation is often, by necessity, based on 
distinctions among groups, as it is designed in pursuit of public interests. 
If legislation is rejected as discriminatory because the Human Rights 
Committee is prone to second-guess the legislature’s rationale, the legis-
lature may be tempted to avoid enacting such laws in the first place. 
Thus, it is necessary to work toward developing a more thoughtful  
approach to international equal protection going forward. International 
judicial organs should carefully evaluate the implications of their jur-
isprudence before introducing a sweeping interpretation of equality that 
does not adequately represent international human rights standards. 
Of course, the Committee’s approach is only part of a broader trend to 
extend the scope of the nondiscrimination principle to the international 
plane.12 A central problem with the Committee’s methodology arises 
from the concept of international equal protection itself, since the term’s 
precise meaning is still essentially unsettled. The opaqueness of the non-
discrimination provision calls for a clearly enunciated conceptualization 
and begs the question whether there is a generalized human rights norm 
to treat all persons equally, or whether international law is only con-
cerned with certain invidious distinctions. Since the case-by-case  
approach applied by international human rights institutions lacks  
coherence at present, adjudicative bodies should look to the experience 
                                                                                                             
 8. See Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, (Communication No. 1306/2004), U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/91/D/1306/2004 [hereinafter Haraldsson and Sveinsson]. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See infra Part I.A. Another difference is the fact that the Lochner Court applied 
economic due process while the Human Rights Committee applies equal protection  
analysis. But, in effect, both rationales can be used to invalidate economic legislation. 
 11. See, e.g., Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8. 
 12. In 2001, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights interpreted Article 24 
of the American Convention on Human Rights as embodying a general principle of non-
discrimination, which would then be applicable to socio-economic cases. Morales de 
Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 4/01, OEA/Ser./L/V/ 
II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 31 (2001). 
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gained over time under domestic equal protection jurisprudence in order 
to refine their approach. 
In this Article, I explore the most recent developments in international 
jurisprudence in order to evaluate the consequences of such develop-
ments critically and make suggestions for the future of nondiscrimination 
analysis. In Part I of this Article, I will explain the expanding role of 
equal protection in international law, and highlight jurisprudential short-
comings and misconceptions within recent Human Rights Committee 
views. In Part II, I will examine equal protection interpretation under 
various domestic constitutional regimes and argue that such comparative 
analysis should guide international equal protection application. Finally, 
in Part III, I will propose a coherent doctrinal framework for the future of 
international equal protection jurisprudence. 
I. THE SPREAD OF INTERNATIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION 
The principles of nondiscrimination and equal protection have been on 
the dockets of international human rights institutions for decades, and 
various conventions and treaty mechanisms have been established in  
order to deal with specific types of discrimination.13 Still, while the  
concept of “equal protection” is embedded in the existing comprehensive 
human rights instruments, the exact meaning of the term as used in  
various clauses requires clarification. 
Whereas the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination14 and the International Convention on the  
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women15 are tailored 
to specific distinctions, the ICCPR and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)16 both prohibit general 
discriminatory application of domestic laws based on distinctions pro-
vided within the covenants themselves.17 Such prohibited grounds of dis-
                                                                                                             
 13. See International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 95-18, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted Dec. 
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 14. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, supra note 13. 
 15. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
supra note 13. 
 16. ICESCR, supra note 13. 
 17. For a comparison of the nondiscrimination provisions under the different human 
rights treaties, see Aileen McColgan, Principles of Equality and Protection From  
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crimination include: “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.”18 
Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights19 and Article 14 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms prohibit discrimination on identical grounds.20 
While these provisions spell out an accessory right, providing only for 
the equal enjoyment of conventional rights, Article 26 of the ICCPR goes 
                                                                                                             
Discrimination in International Human Rights Law, 2003 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 157, 
157–75 (2003). Further examples of Conventions pertaining to the prevention of discrim-
ination are the following: International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment 
of the Crime of Apartheid, open for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243; Inter-
national Convention against Apartheid in Sports, adopted Dec. 10, 1985, 1500 U.N.T.S. 
161; International Labor Organization, Convention concerning discrimination in respect 
of employment and occupation, adopted June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention 
against Discrimination in Education, adopted Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93; Interna-
tional Labor Organization, Convention concerning equal remuneration for men and 
women workers for work of equal value, adopted June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303. See 
also, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW (Dagmar Schiek et. al. eds., 2007). 
 18. The ICCPR reads: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recog-
nized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, co-
lour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. 
ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2, ¶ 1. See also, ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 2, ¶ 2. For the 
guarantee of equal enjoyment of the Covenant rights to men and women, see ICCPR, 
supra note 3, art. 3. 
 19. Article 1, paragraph 1 reads: 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and free-
doms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction 
the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimina-
tion for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opi-
nion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condi-
tion. 
American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, adopted Nov. 
22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 1(1) [hereinafter ACHR]. 
 20. Art. 14 of the Convention states: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 14. 
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even further21 by referring to equal protection “before the law” as a mat-
ter of formal equality and equal protection “of the law” as a matter of 
substantive equality, and by neglecting to limit the Article’s application 
to the rights enumerated in the Covenant.22 The American Convention on 
Human Rights also provides for a comprehensive right to equal protec-
tion.23 No such general provision is found in the European Convention. 
However, Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention, promulgated in 
2005, extends the nondiscrimination principle beyond the scope of con-
ventional rights24 by providing for a general prohibition of discrim-
ination, which applies to any right set forth by law.25 
Though the nondiscrimination principle has generally been recognized 
in various treaties, the search continues for a more fleshed out interp-
retation. As the body called upon to apply and interpret the ICCPR, the  
Human Rights Committee has dealt extensively with the meaning of 
“equal protection of the law.”26 As compared to Article 2(1), the broad 
                                                                                                             
 21. Article 26 states: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any dis-
crimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, po-
litical or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26. 
 22. Torkel Opsahl, Equality in Human Rights Law: With Particular Reference to 
Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in FORTSCHRITT IM 
BEWUSSTSEIN DER GRUNDUND MENSCHENRECHTE [PROGRESS IN THE SPIRIT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS] 51 (Manfred Nowak et al. eds., 1988); see Syméon Karagiannis, Considérations 
sur l’article 26 du Pacte des Nations Unies relatif aux droits civils et politiques, in LES 
DROITS DE L’HOMME AU SEUIL DU TROISIÈME MILLÉNAIRE: MÉLANGES EN HOMMAGE À 
PIERRE LAMBERT 467–97 (Pierre Lambert ed., 2000). 
 23. The Convention notes that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law. Consequently, 
they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law.” ACHR, supra 
note 19, art. 24. 
 24. Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 2000, Europ. T.S. No. 177 [hereinafter 
Protocol No. 12]. 
 25. Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Protocol states: 
The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimi-
nation on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status. 
Protocol No. 12, supra note 24, at 2, art. 1, ¶ 1. 
 26. See cases cited supra note 5. 
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wording of Article 26 has led the Committee to deal with a considerable 
number of discrimination cases that, upon first glance, would not appear 
to fall within the realm of civil and political rights.27 By 1987, the Com-
mittee had already determined that Article 26 prohibits discrimination in 
law or in practice in any area regulated and protected by public author-
ities, including unemployment benefits.28 
This line of jurisprudence is of particular relevance to cases implicat-
ing a variety of socioeconomic interests. Since the ICESCR does not yet 
provide for an individual complaint procedure, the complaint mechanism 
under the ICCPR seems to be an attractive alternative for complainants 
to pursue their claims before the Committee. This is all the more true 
since the Committee has recently taken an even broader interpretation of 
its mandate, and has, in the process, opened new grounds for challenging 
allegedly discriminatory practices and laws. While the Committee orig-
inally only dealt with clear-cut cases of gender discrimination in socio-
economic matters, it has now indicated that it is willing to apply Article 
26 to other types of discriminatory distinctions. This change of course 
will likely prompt complainants to use the equal protection clause as a 
vehicle to enforce social and economic rights more generally, as evinced 
by recent disputes to come before the Committee. 
A. Application to Economic Issues 
A recent dispute reviewed by the Committee, Haraldsson and Sveins-
son v. Iceland,29 illustrates the new areas of application of the universal 
nondiscrimination clause of ICCPR Article 26. In Haraldsson, the 
Committee dealt with the Fisheries Management System in Iceland and 
the question of whether giving preferential treatment to existing fishing 
licenses violated new license applicants’ equal protection rights.30 In re-
sponse to overfishing, Iceland adopted an Act in 1985 requiring a fishing 
permit for several species of fish.31 The Act gave preferential treatment 
to those vessels that had received permits in the previous three years: 
only those ships were entitled to fishing quotas on the basis of their catch 
                                                                                                             
 27. See Tufyal Choudhury, The Drafting of Article 26 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, 2002 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 591 (2002). For the early 
discussion in the Committee regarding these matters, see Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Equality 
and Nondiscrimination, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL 
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 246, 246–69 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). 
 28. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5, at 168, para. 12.3. 
 29. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 4. 
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performance during the reference period.32 A new permit was only to be 
granted if a vessel already in the fleet was decommissioned. However, 
because the quota share of a vessel was transferrable, accession to the 
regulated fishing market, at least in practice, depended on the purchase 
or lease of such a quota on the free market.33 
Market prices for quotas rose considerably and the complainants in this 
case, having purchased a ship without an attached quota, faced bankrupt-
cy from the entitlement leasing expense.34 They denounced the system 
and started fishing without catch entitlements in order to challenge the 
Act’s validity.35 As a result, the complainants were fined, and this sen-
tence was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Iceland.36 Shortly thereafter 
the complainants declared bankruptcy and faced considerable financial 
hardship in the subsequent months.37 
The authors of the communication claimed that the quota discriminated 
against new fishers, who had to pay money in order to take part in the 
fishing of regulated species, and further denied the fishers the opportuni-
ty to pursue the occupation of their choice in accordance with “the prin-
ciples of freedom of employment and equality . . . .”38 Iceland contested 
these claims, pointing out that freedom of employment is not protected 
by the ICCPR.39 According to Iceland, there was also no impermissible 
discrimination in violation of Article 26, because the fisheries manage-
ment system sought to prevent over-fishing and to protect the vital public 
interest of the State.40 
One might assume that this case, which was effectively concerned with 
economic matters, would be dealt with under the “freedom of work” doc-
trine.41 In jurisdictions that provide this right via their constitution, this is 
                                                                                                             
 32. Lög um stjórn fiskveiða 19861987 [Act 97/1985] (Stjórnartíðindi A-Deild, 
1985, 32327) (Ice.). 
 33. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, at 6, para. 2.8. The Act, however, stated 
that the fishing banks around Iceland were the common property of the nation and that 
the quotas to the ships would  not give rise to rights of private ownership. Id. 
 34. Id. at 6, para. 3.1. 
 35. Id. at 6–7, paras. 3.2–3.3. 
 36. Id. at 7, para. 3.4. 
 37. Id. at 7, para. 3.5. 
 38. Id. at 7, para. 4.1. 
 39. Id. at 9, para. 5.6. 
 40. Id. at 9, para. 5.7. 
 41. See David P. Currie, Lochner Abroad: Substantive Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 SUP CT. REV. 333, 347, n. 110 (1989), 
reprinted in 9 GERMAN L.J. 2179, 2194, n. 110 (2008) (describing the basis of the doc-
trine in German law to be the belief that one’s vocation “is the foundation of a person’s 
10 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
primarily a matter of access to, and the practice of, a profession.42  
However, in the absence of a complaint procedure under the ICESCR, 
the challenge was brought under the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR.43 
B. The Sweeping Interpretation of the Nondiscrimination Grounds 
The Committee, in its analysis under Article 26, reiterated its prior in-
terpretation that discrimination does not only apply to exclusions and 
restrictions, but also to preferences.44 The differentiation between fishers 
in business during the statutory reference period and fishers who had to 
purchase or lease quota shares from the first group was considered to be 
a distinction which “is based on grounds equivalent to those of property.”45 
In order to satisfy Article 26, such a distinction must be objective and 
reasonable according to the standing jurisprudence of the Committee.46 
Though the aim of protecting fish stocks was considered legitimate, the 
measure of granting quotas on a permanent basis was not deemed  
reasonable by the majority of the Committee.47 They preferred a system 
in which quotas no longer in use would revert to the State for allocation 
to new holders in accordance with standards of fairness and equity.48 
Though the Icelandic statutory regime raises questions about its  
inherent fairness, it is more questionable whether it qualifies as an un-
lawful discriminatory State action. The Committee’s line of reasoning, 
however, is based on a broad scope of nondiscrimination protection and 
establishes a high level of justification under Article 26. In short, the 
Committee considerably extended the grounds of nondiscrimination. At 
issue was the distinction between those taking part in fishing during the 
reference period and new fishers. The Committee asserted that this stat-
utory distinction was equivalent to a distinction based on property,49 but, 
in effect, the distinction was not based on property, or anything of the 
sort. Properly understood, the distinction turns on the extent of fishing 
                                                                                                             
existence through which that person simultaneously contributes to the total social prod-
uct.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] (Basic Law) 
May 23, 1949, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I (BGBI. I), as amended, § 2034, art. 12. 
 43. Id. at 3. Since there is no right to freedom of work in the Civil and Political  
Covenant, the case could only be dealt with under Article 26. 
 44. General Comment No. 18, supra note 6, ¶ 7. 
 45. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, para. 10.3. 
 46. See, e.g., Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5, at 167–69 paras. 12–15. 
 47. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, para. 10.4. 
 48. Id. 
 49. According to Yuji Iwasawa, in his dissenting opinion in the Haraldsson matter, 
the case involved none of the explicitly-listed grounds of prohibited discrimination. Id. at 
25–26. 
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conducted in a given reference period. This is a purely factual distinction 
relating to actions taken. It is true that the statute allowed established 
fishers to accrue an economic asset (the right to partake in fishing), but 
this was merely a side effect of the regulation, not the result of any dis-
criminatory distinction. By the time the complainants entered the market, 
most of their competitors had already purchased their quotas as well. The 
real problem in this case is not the distinction among competitors but the 
permanent distribution of quotas. This is not a matter of discrimination 
on the basis of property (or anything equivalent) but a matter of access to 
the profession. Such a dispute should be dealt with under Article 6 of the 
ICESCR. It seems that the Committee circumvented the ICCPR’s lack of 
such a provision by resorting to the nondiscrimination clause. 
There is another argument that cautions against such an extensive read-
ing of Article 26. If discrimination on the basis of property is interpreted 
to prohibit de facto discrimination on the basis of economic assets, there 
may hardly be any socioeconomic regulation immune to challenge. Such 
loose interpretation goes far beyond that which appeared in earlier 
Committee recommendations. For instance, in Zwaan de Fries v. the 
Netherlands50 and Broeks v. the Netherlands,51 the Committee discussed 
the prohibition of gender discrimination in unemployment law, and ex-
plained that Article 26 went beyond Article 2, in that it was also applica-
ble to rights not guaranteed by the ICCPR.52 However, these were cases 
involving de jure instances of gender discrimination. Once it was deter-
mined that Article 26 was applicable, it was undeniable that there had 
been an impermissible discrimination on the grounds of sex, because the 
laws themselves were based on gender stereotypes. 
In Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, on the other hand, the Com-
mittee substantially broadened the scope of challengeable discriminatory 
distinctions in ruling for the complainants. After all, it is one thing to use 
an expansive reading of the covenant to forbid racial and gender discrim-
ination in areas of life that are not explicitly protected,53 but it is quite 
another to read the grounds for discrimination so broadly as to equate 
                                                                                                             
 50. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5. 
 51. Broeks v. Netherlands (Communication No. 172/1984), U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 
Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 139, U.N. Doc. A/42/40 (Jan. 1, 1987)  
[hereinafter Broeks v. Netherlands]. 
 52. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5, at 149, para. 12.3; Broeks v. Nether-
lands, supra note 51, at 149, para. 12.3. 
 53. This was the view taken by the Committee in Broeks and Zwaan-de Vries. 
Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5; Broeks v. Netherlands, supra note 51. See 
also General Comment No. 18, supra note 6, ¶ 12. 
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almost all imaginable distinctions with those listed explicitly in Article 
26. Therein lies the crucial difference between Zwaan de Fries and Ha-
raldsson. Whereas Zwaan de Fries only scrutinized those socioeconomic 
regulations that discriminated between men and women,54 Haraldsson 
essentially opened the door to challenges for a much wider array of  
socioeconomic regulations—whenever a potential complainant can claim 
membership to some sort of identifiable group—and this is problematic.55 
The trouble with the Committee’s interpretation is not the application 
of the nondiscrimination principle to non-Conventional rights, but,  
rather, the seemingly unlimited extension of impermissible grounds.56 
Properly viewed, however, the Committee’s interpretation was part of a 
broader jurisprudential development established in earlier cases, which 
indicated a gradual extension of the scope of nondiscrimination. Those 
prior decisions resorted to the term “other status,” and thereby extended 
the grounds of nondiscrimination under Article 26 beyond those explicitly 
mentioned in the Convention.57 In Gueye et al. v. France,58 the Com-
mittee held that differentiation by reference to “nationality acquired upon 
independence” falls within the parameters of “other status.”59 The Com-
mittee has also dealt with discrimination based on marital status, which it 
considered a protected class similar to those enumerated in Article 26.60 
However, the instances in which the Committee considered such dis-
tinctions unreasonable were limited.61 Distinctions such as those between 
                                                                                                             
 54. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5, at 160, para. 2.1. 
 55. After all, socioeconomic legislation is necessarily based on distinctions when it 
seeks to address social costs or benefits affecting specific groups. See Gianluigi Palom-
bella, The Abuse of Rights and the Rule of Law, in ABUSE: THE DARK SIDE OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 5, 12 (András Sajó ed., 2006). Thus, if Article 26 were to apply to 
virtually all distinctions arising under the law, then there would hardly be any area of law 
that could avoid a test for reasonableness. 
 56. But see Ando, supra note 3; Tomuschat, supra note 3. 
 57. See cases cited supra note 6. 
 58. Gueye v. France (Communication No. 196/1985), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. 
Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 189, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (Sept. 29, 
1989). 
 59. Id. at ¶ 9.4. In Guyel, the Committee considered the different treatment of Sene-
galese as compared to French citizens with respect to military pensions. Id. This, howev-
er, cannot be read as a general mandate to treat aliens and nationals equally in the context 
of social-security. Distinctions between citizens and aliens are permissible if based on 
reasonable and objective criteria. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights 
Committee: General Comment No. 15, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/41/40 (Apr. 11, 1986). 
 60. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 625. 
 61. See e.g., Danning v. Netherlands (Communication No. 180/1984), reprinted in 
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 151, para. 14, U.N. 
Doc. A/42/40 (Jan. 1, 1987) [hereinafter Danning v. Netherlands]; Sprenger v. Nether-
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employed and unemployed persons, between graduates and others, be-
tween persons sharing a household with their parents and others, as well 
as between police officers and volunteer firemen, were found to be  
reasonable and objective.62 The significance of this jurisprudence was 
rather limited, not only because these cases involved unique fact patterns, 
but also because of the lenient level of scrutiny applied, which regularly 
upheld legislative distinctions. The interpretation of equal protection in 
Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, on the other hand, was quite novel. 
There, the Committee demanded a high level of justification and  
extended the scope of Article 26 to discrimination based on economic 
circumstances, thereby clearing the way for a far more inclusive economic 
equal protection analysis. Such an extension of the nondiscrimination 
grounds moves Article 26 in the direction of a general principle of equal-
ity, which requires equal treatment in all contexts and on all grounds. 
This is a dubious undertaking that seemingly has no basis in the text of 
the Article itself. Though Article 26 provides for equal protection of the 
law, it explicitly notes that such protection shall be “without any discrim-
ination.”63 What is meant by “discrimination” is then specified in the 
second sentence, which lists “race, colour, sex, language, religion, politi-
cal or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other  
status.”64 Even though reference is made to “other status,” which opens 
the concept of nondiscrimination to new grounds of exclusion, the  
enumeration of impermissible grounds, such as race, sex, and social  
origin, suggests that it must be comparable to the grounds specified. 
It is dubious at best to claim that engagement in fishing during a cer-
tain period of time can be compared to such personal characteristics as 
race, gender, and religion. In effect, extending the grounds of nondis-
crimination to such a vague, almost random, criteria of distinction, which 
relates to entirely fact-specific situations and personal behavior, devalues 
the other grounds of discrimination. As a consequence, almost all  
imaginable groups and activities will fall within the scope of Article 26, 
and, thus, any form of statutory distinction could be scrutinized by the 
Committee. When it comes to international human rights protection, such 
                                                                                                             
lands (Communication No. 395/1990), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the 
Human Rights Committee, at 311, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (Jan. 1, 1987) [hereinafter Spren-
ger v. Netherlands]. 
 62. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 62627. It is, however, doubtful whether such dis-
tinctions fall within the scope of “other status” in the first place. 
 63. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26. 
 64. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26. For a contextual reading of the two sentences, see 
NOWAK, supra note 3, at 609. 
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a generalized concept of equality goes too far.65 Even when appearing 
unreasonable, some distinctions simply cannot be deemed unlawfully 
discriminatory.66 
C. The Level of Scrutiny 
Such a broad interpretation of the nondiscrimination principle is par-
ticularly problematic when combined with a high level of scrutiny for the 
justification of distinctions. In Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, the 
Committee held that the State party had not shown that the particular 
quota system met the requirements of reasonableness.67 The State argued 
that the quota system was necessary to protect sustainable fishing in  
Iceland.68 Though the protection of fish stocks was acknowledged as a 
legitimate aim, the existence of permanent entitlements rendered the law 
unreasonable.69 The application of the reasonableness test in Haraldsson 
and Sveinsson v. Iceland shows that the standard for justification is more 
demanding than a basic “rational basis” review.70 The Committee en-
gaged in a searching analysis of proportionality in which it asked what 
means would be least intrusive while still effective.71 Yet, by favoring a 
revertible quota, the majority of members substituted their preferences 
for the Icelandic legislature’s and effectively applied a necessity test. 
It is startling that the Committee, in just a few sentences, concluded 
that the quota fishing system of Iceland was unreasonable. The case in-
volved a complicated matter of economic and environmental regulation 
with competing and conflicting public and private interests.72 The legis-
                                                                                                             
 65. See Michael Stolleis, Historische und ideengeschichtliche Entwicklung des 
Gleichheitssatzes, in GLEICHHEIT UND NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND 
INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 7-22 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003). 
 66. See Alexander Somek, Equality as Reasonableness. Constitutional Normativity in 
Demise, in ABUSE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 191215 (András Sajó ed., 
2006). 
 67. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, para. 10.4. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. The United States Supreme Court, in economic matters not involving suspect or 
quasi suspect classifications, has applied the arbitrary and capricious test, a low standard 
of reasonableness. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 414 (1971). 
 71. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, para. 10.4. 
 72. Public interest demanded restrictions on commercial fishing in order to prevent 
over-fishing. Id. at para. 5.7. The government enacting the legislation tried to reconcile 
the interest in the environment with the interest in a prosperous fishing industry. Id. at 
para. 5.8. The goal of the quota system was to manage fisheries in the most sustainable 
and efficient manner in order to guarantee profitable and economically efficient utiliza-
tion of the fish stocks. Id. at para 5.7–8. But with the distribution of quotas, new fishers’ 
2010] THE RISE OF EQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 
 
lature considered not only the public interest in conservation of their nat-
ural environment, but also the interest in a vital and sustainable fishing 
industry.73 The rights of those taking part in the fishing economy, as well 
as those trying to enter the business, also had to be taken into account.74 
The divergence of these interests did not render the solution an easy one. 
It involved value judgments and prospective decisions. The State party 
must have concluded that a different model would jeopardize operating 
vessels’ investments (i.e., previously purchased quotas) and would con-
sequently endanger the fishing industry in the future. The Committee, in 
open disagreement with the Supreme Court of Iceland, did not accept this 
rationale.75 
The lack of deference to the careful evaluation of the matter by State 
organs is striking. The Icelandic statutory framework had been revised 
several times in response to judgments by the Supreme Court of Iceland 
in order to accommodate individual rights.76 Finally, the highest court of 
Iceland had held the restriction on commercial fishing by the quota sys-
tem to be compatible with the equal protection clause of the Constitu-
tion.77 The court, in explaining its finding, noted that permanent catch 
entitlements had made it possible for operators to plan their activities for 
the long term.78 It is difficult to see why such a responsible analysis and 
revision by the State party should not be considered reasonable. Taking 
                                                                                                             
interests in access to the fishing industry conflicted with the interests of those existing 
fishers who had already acquired quotas. Meanwhile the government merely tried to  
facilitate long-term planning, id. at para. 5.8, and to create stability for those who had 
invested in fishery operations. Id. at para 5.3. The government acknowledged that exist-
ing fishers had become dependent on this sector for their livelihoods. Id. at para 5.7. With 
the permanent quotas, the government sought to protect those individuals who had direct 
interests in the protection of extensive investment in vessel operations, id. at para 5.7, 
and, at the same time, the government took action for the sake of the general public inter-
est. Id. at para 2.7. 
 73. Id. at para. 10.4. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. at para. 10.4. 
 76. See id. at 4, para. 2.1. 
 77. Id. at 6, para. 2.6. According to Iceland’s Constitution: 
All shall be equal before the law and enjoy human rights without regard to sex, 
religion, opinion, national origin, race, color, financial status, parentage and 
other status. . . . Men and women shall enjoy equal rights in every respect. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ICELAND, art. 65, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 29 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Ágúst Árnason trans., 1999). 
 78. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, para. 2.6. 
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into account that the case involved purely economic matters79 without 
any kind of invidious discrimination (such as a distinction on the basis of 
race or gender), it would have been adequate to defer to the parliament’s 
evaluation and to limit judicial review to an arbitrariness standard.80 The 
Committee’s mere perception that a statutory regulation was unjust or 
inequitable should have been insufficient to render it in violation of the 
ICCPR. 
D. The Role and Capacities of the Committee 
It is not clear whether the consequences of this new kind of equal pro-
tection analysis have been fully considered. If Article 26 is continually 
interpreted and applied in this fashion, the Committee will soon be con-
fronted with a veritable onslaught of disputes encompassing a vast array 
of fact patterns. Such disputes will demand a high degree of competence 
in order to be properly evaluated and the Committee will be required to 
balance competing concerns to determine whether the high threshold of 
reasonableness advocated in Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland has 
been met. Not only will professional and technical competence be neces-
sary, the Committee will also need a deeper understanding of compli-
cated areas of economic and social regulation.81 Such an undertaking 
creates an unnecessary and distracting burden on an international human 
rights body. 
It is true that in the late 1980s the interpretation of Article 26 as a non-
accessory right in Zwaan de Fries attracted similar criticism,82 but that 
interpretive leap was clearly justified. The current trend of extending the 
meaning of this provision further by moving the nondiscrimination rule 
in the direction of a less deferential, general equal protection principle 
has a new quality. Previously, the Committee limited its analysis to the 
grounds spelled out in Article 26, and, thus, the judicial analysis was re-
strained by the text of the Convention.83 In Zwaan de Fries v. the Nether-
                                                                                                             
 79. Arguably, Article 26 was never implicated here, because the statute at issue did 
not concern any of the nondiscrimination grounds. 
 80. See e.g., Des Fours Walderode v. Czech Republic, supra note 5, at 94; Brok and 
Brokova v. Czech Republic (Communication No. 774/1997), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. 
Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 110, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (Jan. 1, 
2002) [hereinafter Brok and Brokova v. Czech Republic]. 
 81. Opsahl in 1988 already questioned whether the Committee is competent to  
become an effective Ombudsman for Equality in every area covered by legislation.  
Opsahl, supra note 22, at 64. 
 82. See, e.g., Tomuschat, supra note 3, at 227. 
 83. In P.P.C. v. the Netherlands the Committee explained that art. 26 “does not  
extend to differences of results in the application of common rules in the allocation of 
benefits.” P.P.C. v. the Netherlands (Communication No. 212/1986), reprinted in, U.N. 
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lands, it was clear that the gender discrimination at issue was based on 
stereotypes and therefore unreasonable.84 But if a dispute is purely eco-
nomic (i.e., if it concerns an area of purely socioeconomic issues), and if 
the distinction is based on economic facts (e.g, fishing during the refer-
ence period in the case of Haraldsson and Sveinsson), the analysis of the 
regulation’s reasonableness will involve an assessment of factors that lie 
beyond the sphere of human rights standards. There is then a risk that 
claimants will use the individual complaint procedure to have a broad 
range of legislation reviewed by the Committee on the basis of equal pro-
tection. This will lead to an unmanageable load of cases and a reduction 
in judicial effectiveness. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether such a 
course of action would further the interests in economic, social, and cul-
tural rights. The ICESCR is much better equipped with the expertise to 
resolve such issues and will be competent to consider individual comm-
unications once the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR enters into force.85 
Fortunately, several members of the Committee took nuanced positions 
in dissent. Sir Nigel Rodley, for instance, having acknowledged the diffi-
culties a nonexpert international body faces in attempting to master the 
issues at stake, called for greater deference to the State party’s determi-
nation.86 Yuki Iwasawa also advocated a wider scope of legislative dis-
cretion in economic regulation.87 Ruth Wedgwood concurred with  
Iwasawa, arguing that the ICCPR is not a “manifesto for economic  
deregulation” and that the Committee should remain true to the limits of 
its legal and practical competence in order to protect the important rights 
covered by the Covenant.88 Elisabeth Palm, Ivan Shearer, and Iulia  
Antoanella Motoc, in their dissenting opinions, did not require such  
deference.89 Instead, they required distinctions to be “based on objective 
ground” and “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”90 They  
concluded, however, that Iceland had carried out a “careful balance” and 
                                                                                                             
Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 244, ¶ 6.2, U.N. Doc. 
A/43/40 (Sept. 28, 1988). 
 84. The Netherlands, by changing the law retroactively, seemed to acknowledge that 
the differentiation involved gender discrimination. See Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, 
supra note 5, at 162, para. 4.5. 
 85. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/435 (Nov. 28, 2008). 
 86. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, at 24. 
 87. Id. at 25–26. 
 88. Id. at 27. 
 89. Id. at 22.  
 90. Id. The Committee, however, used the terms “objective” and “reasonable” in 
describing the standard they would adhere to. Id. at 19–20, ¶ 10.2. 
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met this test.91 This lack of unanimity among the members may indicate 
that the Committee will reevaluate and refine its approach to equal pro-
tection analysis in the future. 
II. LEARNING FROM CONSTITUTIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION 
The following section will make some suggestions for the future  
conceptualization of international equal protection. In order to develop a 
solid and constructive approach, it is necessary to evaluate the underlying 
rationales of the equal protection doctrine. With that end in mind, con-
sideration of the evolution of the equal protection principle in the context 
of domestic law and its interpretation over time is instructive.92 
A. The Focus on Grounds of Nondiscrimination 
The equal protection principle, a fundamental feature of modern con-
stitutional law, has many facets and has evolved substantially over the 
past two centuries. Equal protection “before the law” was first empha-
sized as early as the French Revolution.93 It required equal application of 
the law and thus became particularly relevant to the administration of 
law.94 Later, the Civil War Amendments to the United States Constitution 
introduced the principle of equal protection “of the law,” which binds the 
legislature, as well as the judiciary and the executive.95 The Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”96 The earliest interpretation 
of this edict was limited to the prohibition of slavery.97 In the nineteenth 
century, the concept of comprehensive, substantive equal protection was 
not yet developed.98 It was an advent of the twentieth century that  
                                                                                                             
 91. Id. at 22. 
 92. For the relationship between comparative law and international law, see George 
A. Bermann, Le droit comparé et le droit international: allis ou ennemis?, 2003 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 519 (2003). 
 93. DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN DE 1789, art. 6. 
 94. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 598. 
 95. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
In Germany, the idea of equal protection of the law was first expressed in the text of the 
Constitution of the Weimar Republic. See Weimarer Reichsverfassung [Constitution] art. 
109 [F.R.G.], reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY 379 (Albert P. Blaustein 
& Jay A. Sigler eds., 1988). 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 97. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873). 
 98. For the historical development of the nondiscrimination doctrine, see, Stolleis, 
supra note 65, at 7–122. See also Opsahl, supra note 22; Karl Josef Partsch, Fundamental 
Principles of Human Rights: Self-Determination, Equality and Nondiscrimination, in 1 
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domestic and international law went beyond procedural protection and 
focused on the more specific prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
certain individual characteristics.99 
Beginning with the Slaughter-House Cases in 1873, the U.S. Supreme 
Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to prohibit racial discrimination.100 Though this was the first  
official enunciation of the equality principle, the Court refused to apply 
the clause beyond the context of discrimination based on race and  
alienage until the 1960s.101 Then, the Court gradually tabulated a list of 
quasi-suspect classifications covering such grounds as gender and  
illegitimacy.102 More recently, the Court has refused to expand the list 
further, reasoning that the Equal Protection Clause could then be used to 
expand constitutional rights beyond those explicitly recognized in the 
Constitution.103 As Justice Powell explained, “It is not the province of 
this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of  
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”104 In sum, despite its  
seemingly broad wording, the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.  
Constitution has never been interpreted by the Supreme Court as provid-
ing for general equality. The pursuit of such broader goals has instead 
been left to the legislature.105 
The insight that equal protection is best expressed by identifying spe-
cific grounds of nondiscrimination was also manifested in several other 
post-World War II constitutions.106 These examples usually differ from 
the open-ended text of the French and U.S. Constitutions.107 Though they 
                                                                                                             
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 61, 72 (Karel Vasak & Philip Als-
ton eds., 1982). 
 99. Partsch, supra note 98, at 73. 
 100. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81. 
 101. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590 (1964). In Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United 
States, the Supreme Court explained that discrimination on the basis of race and alienage 
is immediately suspect. Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 
(1944). 
 102. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 103. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1966); Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1966); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970). 
 106. Edward J. Eberle, German Equal Protection: Substantive Review of Economic 
Measures, 9 GERMAN L.J. 2095, 2099 (2008). 
 107. For ready access to constitutional law worldwide, see CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: A SERIES OF UPDATED TEXTS, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHRONOLOGIES AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. 
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also provide for equal protection of the law, they tend to include non-
discrimination clauses that define equal protection by spelling out  
impermissible grounds of nondiscrimination.108 The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, for example, mentions race, national or ethnic  
origin, color, religion, sex, age, and mental or physical disability.109 The 
South African Constitution contains a more elaborate catalog.110 Apart 
from the traditional nondiscrimination grounds, such as race, color,  
ethnicity, alienage, and gender, it outlaws discrimination on the basis of 
wealth, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, 
birth, sexual orientation, pregnancy, marital status, and social origin.111 
In both jurisdictions, constitutional equal protection review is not a mat-
ter of general equality but of invidious discrimination.112 According to 
the Supreme Court of Canada, “[E]quality means that our society cannot 
tolerate legislative distinctions that treat certain people as second-class 
citizens, that demean them, that treat them as less capable for no good 
                                                                                                             
Flanz eds., 1971). See also, Andreas Kellerhals & Dirk Trüten, Equality under Swiss 
Law, 1999 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 37, 3753 (1999). 
 108. The United Kingdom’s Canadian Act, for example, provides for equal protection 
before and under the law, as well as for equal protection and benefit of the law without 
discrimination, while also spelling out specific grounds of nondiscrimination. Canada 
Act, 1982, c.11, § 15.1, sched. B (Eng.). For other examples of constitutional protection 
of equal protection with specific prohibitions, see The Instrument of Government [Con-
stitution] arts. 15 and 16 (Swed.), reprinted in 17 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF 
THE WORLD 7 (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2005); Constitution of the Republic of 
Finland, § 6, reprinted in, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 2 (Rüdiger 
Wolfrum et al. eds., 2006); Constitution of the Russian Federation, art. 19, reprinted in, 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 4 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2002); Consti-
tution of the Italian Republic, art. 3, reprinted in, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF 
THE WORLD 1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2006); Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Spain, art. 14, reprinted in, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 12 (Gisbert 
H. Flanz ed., 2004). 
 109. Canda Act, 1982, c.11, § 15.1, sched. B (Eng.). According to the Supreme Court 
of Canada these categories are neither exclusive or exhaustive, but merely representative. 
Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.R. 513 (Can.).The Court, therefore, extended protection to 
same-sex partners. 
 110. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, ch. 2, § 9, reprinted in, 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 12 (Gisbert H. Flanz & Patricie H. 
Ward eds., 2004). 
 111. Id. For an overview of constitutional equal protection in South Africa, see  
Lourens W.H. Ackermann, Equality under the 1996 South African Constitution, in 
GLEICHHEIT UND NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN 
MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 10517 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003). 
 112. See, e.g., Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.); Prinsloo v. van der Linde 
1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) at paras. 31–33 (S. Afr.). 
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reason, or that otherwise offend fundamental human dignity.”113 The 
South African Constitutional Court also gives special attention to specific 
grounds of nondiscrimination and has interpreted the general equal pro-
tection clause narrowly.114 
B. Equality as a Measure to Probe Legislation? 
There have been efforts in a few jurisdictions to go beyond textual 
nondiscrimination distinctions and test legislation under general prin-
ciples of equality, but those efforts have been challenged.115 One exam-
ple comes from the German constitution, the German Basic Law, which 
provides both a general principle of equality clause in Article 3(1) and a 
nondiscrimination clause in Article 3(3).116 In practice, the latter plays a 
less significant role due to the fact that constitutional adjudicators are 
mainly concerned with the general equality principle.117 In that sense, 
equal protection has become a structural principle for the organization of 
government, and is utilized primarily to limit the government’s discretio-
nary power.118 With this emphasis, German equal protection analysis dif-
fers from that of many other jurisdictions that focus on specified grounds 
of discrimination.119 Nonetheless, it should be noted that German courts 
do not apply a uniform standard of review for all inequalities.120 The  
level of scrutiny varies depending on the subject matter concerned and 
the distinction upon which unequal treatment is based.121 The German 
                                                                                                             
 113. Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.R. 513, at ¶ 36. 
 114. The South African Constitutional Court only requires a rational connection to a 
legitimate government purpose for differentiations under section 9(1). Prinsloo v. van der 
Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) at paras. 31–33; Harksen v. Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 
(CC) (S. Afr.). 
 115. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Christian Starck, Commentary 
on Article 3, in 1 DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ 310 (Hermann von Mangoldt, et al. eds., 
1999); see also Wojciech Sadurski, Perspectives on Equal Protection (pt. 1), 1998 
ST.LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 63, 71 (noting that the prospect of treating  
everyone equally is “an impossible and unattractive ideal”). 
 116. Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] (Basic Law) May 23, 
1949, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I (BGBI.I), as amended, § 2034, art 3. See generally  
Susanne Baer, Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court, 5 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 277–279 (1999); Michael Sachs, The Equality Rule Before the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, 1998 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 
139. 
 117. Baer, supra note 116, at 251. 
 118. Sachs, supra note 116, at 148. 
 119. Baer, supra note 116, at 260. 
 120. Sachs, supra note 116, at 139. 
 121. Baer, supra note 116, at 258; Sachs, supra note 116, at 141. 
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Federal Constitutional Court applies a high level of scrutiny only with 
respect to distinctions implicating fundamental rights and distinctions 
based on grounds sufficiently similar to those specified in Article 3(3), 
such as race, sex, gender, language, national origin, disability, faith,  
religion, and political opinion.122 Other types of distinctions are  
evaluated for arbitrariness.123 Though German jurisprudence does not 
formally distinguish between different classifications, such as suspect 
classification and quasi-suspect classification, the courts’ analyses vary 
depending on the nature of the distinction involved and its potential im-
plications.124 Compared to the United States’ jurisprudence, the analysis 
of the German Constitutional Court is generally more probing, but the 
standard of review applied in individual cases depends nonetheless on 
the distinction made.125 In this sense there are parallels between these 
jurisdictions, as will be further addressed below.126 
Suffice it to say that the concept of equal protection has not remained 
fixed throughout its history. Equal protection of the law, as a matter of 
substantive equality, has raised many difficulties, as the principle of 
equality itself is intrinsically vague and therefore requires specifica-
tion.127 Most courts have tried to give meaning to this general principle 
by focusing on the concept of nondiscrimination, and this is true even in 
jurisdictions where the text of the constitutional equal protection clause 
                                                                                                             
 122. Over a period of 30 years, Article 3 has been interpreted as a prohibition of  
arbitrariness in legislation, a rather lenient standard of judicial review. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 23, 1951, 1 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 14 (52) (F.R.G.). The so-
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[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 7, 1980, 55 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 72 (88) (F.R.G.); Bundesverfassungsgericht 
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the French Conseil Constitutionnel, see Olivier Jouanjan, Gleichheitssatz und Nicht-
Diskriminierung in Frankreich, in GLEICHHEIT UND NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM 
NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 59–78 (Rüdiger Wolfrum 
ed., 2003). 
 123. The German test of arbitrariness is more demanding than basic rationality review 
in the United States. See, Eberle, supra note 106, at 2100 (2008). 
 124. Sachs, supra note 116, at 153. 
 125. Eberle, supra note 106, at 2100. 
 126. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 127. Sadurski, supra note 115, at 7172. 
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is open-ended, such as the United States.128 The interpretation of such 
general clauses reveals a focus on specific types of distinctions, requiring 
higher standards of justification.129 A general equal protection analysis 
going beyond these nondiscrimination grounds is rather exceptional in 
constitutional review.130 It is very controversial; thus, it is far from 
representing a universal consensus.131 If exercised at all, such an  
approach usually applies different standards of review depending on the 
nature of the discrimination at issue.132 
C. The Transfer to International Equal Protection 
Given the historical development of equal protection norms in domes-
tic law, it should come as no surprise that the equality principle has also 
been codified as a nondiscrimination principle on the international  
level.133 The ICCPR, for instance, incorporated both the principle of 
equality “before the law” and equality “of the law.”134 However, lan-
guage within the ICCPR indicates that its drafters never meant to provide 
for general quality with respect to all socioeconomic legislation—the 
ICCPR explicitly states that equal protection “of the law” merely protects 
against discrimination on specified grounds.135 In this sense, Article 26 of 
the ICCPR exhibits several parallels to modern equal protection provi-
sions, and the grounds listed in Article 26 seem to reflect an international 
consensus with respect to impermissible grounds for discrimination.136 
Consistent with this wording, the early jurisprudence on Article 26  
focused on the nondiscrimination clause as a clarification of equal  
protection.137 However, by extending its application in later reports, the 
Committee has moved it in the direction of a general equality prin-
ciple.138 The nondiscrimination principle, which was introduced in order 
                                                                                                             
 128. See sources cited supra note 107. 
 129. Partsch, supra note 98, at 73. 
 130. Id. at 69. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 73. 
 133. See WARWICK MCKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1983). 
 134. But see Tomuschat, supra note 3, at 227 (suggesting that Article 26 merely  
applies to enacted laws). 
 135. The first sentence of Article 26 explicitly refers to the right to equal protection of 
the law “without any discrimination.” ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26. The second sentence 
identifies specific grounds of discrimination which are impermissible. Id. 
 136. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 598; see also Part II.A. 
 137. See cases cited supra note 6. 
 138. See analysis of Haraldsson Case at supra Part I.B. 
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to clarify the equal protection principle, thereby stands to lose its essen-
tial contours and meaning. Given the historical trajectory from equality 
“before the law,” to equality “of the law,” to the nondiscrimination prin-
ciple, this shift toward an open-ended notion of equality seems almost 
anachronistic. At the very least, it is unparalleled in the world of constitu-
tional law due to its generality and breadth. 
It is important to remember that the ICCPR is an international human 
rights instrument concerned with the protection of fundamental rights.139 
It sets universal standards that its Member States are required to guaran-
tee at a very minimum.140 In the interpretation of these standards, the 
Committee should not lose sight of comparative constitutional law. The 
legal practice of several democratic states has also guided the European 
Court of Human Rights in its analysis of the nondiscrimination principle 
of Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.141 This is not to advocate a least 
common denominator approach to international law, but to encourage the 
consideration of the profound legal discourse that has occurred regarding 
similar matters of domestic law. At least in the area of equal protection, 
it is not the prerogative of the Human Rights Committee or the regional 
courts of human rights to expand their interpretations beyond the views 
shared within comparative constitutional law without a firm legal  
basis.142 
Yet another argument cautioning against such a sweeping interpreta-
tion is that the rise of equal protection of the law has far-reaching struc-
tural implications with respect to nation-state governments and separa-
tion of powers. The dialogue surrounding constitutional equal protection 
has long been preoccupied with the tension between democracy and con-
stitutionalism.143 However, with judicial review moving in the direction 
of a general principle, equality of the law is evolving into more of a tool 
for the judiciary, rather than a matter for democratically-elected legisla-
tures. In short, legislative determinations are increasingly subjected to 
judicial scrutiny in order to ascertain whether they adequately provide for 
                                                                                                             
 139. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 5. 
 140. ICCPR, supra note 3, preamble. 
 141. See, e.g., Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages 
in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium (No. 2), 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 30–31 (1968). 
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substantive equality. This adjudicatory second-guessing could cause a 
chilling effect on socioeconomic legislation, which would be counter-
productive to the societal goals of enhancing social and economic 
wealth. This approach is already questionable on the domestic level, and 
it is definitely not embraced by all states.144 
Furthermore, international institutions, such as the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee, are not in a competent 
position to comprehensively reassess democratic decisions regarding 
economic and social issues.145 It is one thing to evaluate a law as to 
whether it constitutes racial, sexual, or otherwise suspect discrimination, 
but it is quite another thing to demand that all distinctions arising from 
legislation meet vague standards of general equality and pass the sub-
stantial hurdles of review in accordance with reasonable and objective 
criteria. The question of what is reasonable and fair is context-specific; 
thus, it is unlikely that the standard of fairness is homogenous enough to 
qualify as a universal principle, and it is even less likely that it could 
qualify as a human rights principle. In other words, to clothe purely  
economic inequalities as an issue of human rights raises serious concerns 
over the dilution of the human rights ideal. Therefore, international judi-
cial bodies should be confident in exercising more judicial self-restraint, 
not only in the face of their already overwhelming case loads, but also as 
a matter of democracy. International human rights bodies should not 
blithely interfere with, or substitute their analyses of socioeconomic leg-
islation for, that of democratically elected legislators and competent con-
stitutional adjudicators, particularly in disputes that have been carefully 
scrutinized by responsible domestic institutions. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE INTERNATIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION 
ANALYSIS 
As the foregoing discussion has shown, the Committee’s current read-
ing of the equal protection clause of the ICCPR does not reflect broad 
consensus, and a focus on nondiscrimination would be preferable. The 
analysis of the Committee’s interpretation demonstrates that the basic 
problems arise with the proper reading of the grounds of discrimination 
and in the definition of reasonableness. These elements, therefore, are the 
focus of the following discussion. Drawing on domestic jurisprudence, I 
will make suggestions for a future conceptualization of international 
                                                                                                             
 144. Partsch, supra note 98, at 69. 
 145. See Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, at 25–26. 
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equal protection, and I will consider ways to integrate early Committee 
recommendations into a coherent equal protection doctrine. 
A. Focus on Nondiscrimination Analysis 
One step to adequately deal with nondiscrimination cases in the future 
would be to focus on the grounds of discrimination explicitly  
delineated146 and to develop a differentiated doctrinal framework along 
these lines. According to settled Human Rights Committee doctrine,  
Article 26 of the ICCPR is applicable to any field regulated and protected 
by public authorities; however, this does not mean that it provides for a 
principle of general equality.147 Equality “of the law,” pursuant to Article 
26, merely prohibits discrimination on the bases listed in the second 
clause.148 
It is therefore incumbent upon the Committee to further specify the 
grounds of nondiscrimination that will be entertained as potential vio-
lations of Article 26. If an excessively broad interpretation of those 
grounds is not avoided, nearly any distinction could be characterized as 
discrimination, and this would result in comprehensive scrutiny of a ple-
thora of legislation for reasonableness. 
One example is discrimination based on property. As the Haraldsson 
case demonstrates, with a broad reading of the term “property,” almost 
every piece of economic regulation could be considered discriminatory 
on the basis that some controlling distinction is equivalent to a distinc-
tion based on property.149 If “property” were interpreted to include “all 
forms of economic assets,” the Committee would soon have to contend 
with the reasonableness of tax laws, which regularly provide for different 
levels of regulation depending on an individual’s income and assets. 
Subsidies and public procurement laws could also become the subject of 
the Committee’s scrutiny. This would be similarly questionable. Of 
course, to advocate a stricter reading of Article 26 is not to remove 
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“property” from lists of explicit discriminatory distinctions, but it would 
be sensible for the Committee to focus on such cases in which voting 
rights, for example, are afforded discriminately on the basis of property. 
Evaluating economic and social regulations comprehensively but without 
greater doctrinal focus is beyond the scope of Article 26. 
B. The Meaning of “Other Status” 
Though the list in Article 26 is not exhaustive, one should be careful in 
extending it to remote bases of impermissible discrimination. The refer-
ence to discrimination on the basis of “other status” renders the concept 
flexible over time, but there is an implicit caveat that overreaching 
should be avoided. The term “other status” should not be interpreted so 
expansively that it becomes the primary measure of the reasonableness of 
legislative acts.150 Instead, this term should be interpreted contextually, in 
light of the other grounds explicitly listed. 
There is consensus that discrimination based on “race, colour, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, and birth” is unacceptable.151 Further, the grounds listed in Article 
26 refer to identifiably distinct categories.152 They are personal characte-
ristics that should not be the principal determinants of an individual’s 
rights or privileges. Some are immutable, such as race, colour, sex,  
origin, and birth, reflecting the idea that individuals are born equal.153 
Others follow from an exercise of universally accepted fundamental 
rights, such as freedom of religion, the right to own property, and free-
                                                                                                             
 150. See Tomuschat, supra note 3, at 242; Kavanagh v. Ireland (Communication No. 
819/1998), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, 
at 122, paras. 10.2–10.3, U.N. Doc. A/56/4 (Oct. 1, 2001). But see, NOWAK, supra note 3, 
at 627 (endorsing the Committee’s broad interpretation of “other status” in Kavanah v. 
Ireland as “justified”). 
 151. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Mabo v. Queensland 
(1988) 166 C.L.R. 186 (Austl.); Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769 (Can.); Case 
Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwan-
da), 2002 I.C.J. 219 (July 10). 
 152. B.d.B. et al. v. Netherlands (Communication No. 273/1988, adopted 1989), re-
printed in U.N. Hum. Rts.Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 286, para. 
6.7, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (Sept. 29, 1989). 
 153. Tomuschat, supra note 3, at 232 (referring to these characteristics as “stable  
characteristics”). However, Sadurski argues that “immutability” is not an adequate or 
appropriate touchstone for determining the existence of impermissible classifications. 
Sadurski, supra note 115, at 78–84. Instead, he advocates focusing on the wrongful  
motives of prejudice and hostility in discerning whether legislative enactments are dis-
criminatory. Id. at 93–102. 
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dom of expression (political or otherwise). Distinctions based on these 
traits are intolerable because they seriously jeopardize the fundamental 
concept of human rights154—the conviction that individuals are born 
equal with inalienable rights.155 This conviction is called into question 
when a governmental body distinguishes citizens on one of these bases. 
This understanding of nondiscrimination is reflected in the jurisprudence 
of several constitutional courts. As the South African Constitutional 
Court in Prinsloo v. Van der Linde156 explained, unfair discrimination 
means essentially “treating persons differently in a way which impairs 
their fundamental dignity as human beings.”157 A similar approach was 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in the matter of Law v. Cana-
da.158 There, the Court explained that the purpose of the equality rights 
provision of the Canadian Charter is “to prevent the violation of essential 
human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, ste-
reotyping, or political or social prejudice.”159 
It is not only the area of application that triggers equal protection  
analysis, but also the particular nature of the distinction and the criteria 
used in the implementation thereof. In other words, fundamental rights 
are not only implicated where there is unequal treatment with respect to 
the specified areas protected by the Covenant, but also if there is discrim-
ination in other fields of law on the basis of, for example, race, religion, 
opinion, or sex. Therefore, a high standard of scrutiny should be exer-
cised in reviewing the following types of legislation: (1) legislation under 
which distinguishable groups do not enjoy the same fundamental rights 
(e.g., voting rights); and (2) legislation under which a specific type of 
discrimination, such as racial discrimination, is so invidious that it cannot 
be tolerated regardless of the exact context in which the distinction is 
made. For instance, where public benefits are distributed on the basis of 
race, the basic human right of equal dignity before the law is subverted. 
A high burden of justification ought to be demanded from any legislature 
willing to pass such a measure.  
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The distinctions listed in Article 26 make up significant elements of 
personal identity;160 however, other grounds of discrimination, such as 
sexual orientation,161 age,162 and disability,163 should be similarly pro-
tected as immutable personal characteristics.164 Still, it is unclear whether 
additional characteristics, particularly those linked to personal decisions 
of free will, should be included in this list.165 One example is marital  
status. That married couples enjoy preferential treatment such as tax ben-
efits is unlikely to be deemed a human rights issue. Marital status is not 
an invidious distinction because there are a number of legitimate reasons 
for legislatures to afford certain types of benefits to married couples but 
not to single individuals. These reasons include the State’s interest in 
family welfare, as well as the lack of impact on unmarried individuals’ 
fundamental rights (provided they do not wish to marry). 
C. Refining the Standard of Reasonableness 
If a legislature wishes to cast distinctions on the basis of any of the  
explicitly enumerated grounds or on a sufficiently analogous basis, the 
distinction must then be justified. As the Committee has explained re-
peatedly, there is no absolute prohibition on legislation that treats certain 
groups differently from others.166 Rather, it is only those distinctions that 
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are neither objective nor reasonable that are to be deemed impermissi-
ble.167 Still, the standard of reasonableness is inherently vague and  
neither the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on Nondi-
scrimination nor the relevant case law defines the term “reasonable.”168 
Given the recently expanded scope of application of the principle of 
nondiscrimination in the Committee’s jurisprudence, it is necessary to 
specify what is meant by “reasonableness.” Of course, crafting a def-
inition of the term may be easier said than done, and the substantial 
number of dissenting opinions in recent cases indicates that there is a 
controversy among the Committee with respect to the meaning of—and 
the standards for determining—reasonableness.169 
1. Different Levels of Scrutiny 
The “reasonable and objective” criterion is also to be found in domestic 
constitutional equal protection jurisprudence170 and in the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights.171 Generally speaking, what is “rea-
sonable” can only be determined by comparing the competing interests at 
stake in a given dispute. This involves a balancing inquiry; the adjudica-
tor evaluates the legislative aim in relation to its consequences with the 
goal of striking a certain degree of proportionality between the two. In 
the Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of  
Languages in Education in Belgium,”172 the European Court of Human 
Rights explained that “[t]he existence of . . . a justification must be  
assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the measure under consider-
ation.”173 Therefore, the Court requires a legitimate aim and a “reasona-
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ble relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realised.”174 Even though the Human Rights Committee 
does not regularly refer to the term “proportionality,” its earlier method 
of dispute analysis clearly reflected a balancing of the competing inter-
ests.175 Thus, it was unsurprising that Committee members Elisabeth 
Palm, Ivan Shearer, and Iulia Antoanella Motoc used the phrase “propor-
tionate to the legitimate aim” in their dissenting opinions in the  
Haraldsson case.176 
So, ultimately, “reasonable” means “proportionate to a legitimate aim.” 
But the answers to the questions, “what will be found to be a legitimate 
aim?” and, “what consequences will be found to be proportionate to that 
aim?” still depend on the distinction at issue. An examination of compar-
ative jurisprudence reveals that the level of scrutiny varies depending on 
the nature of discrimination. For example, adjudicators require govern-
mental bodies to provide much more compelling justifications if drawing 
distinctions on the basis of race as compared to gender.177 But a more 
compelling justification is required for gender distinctions than for those 
based on property.178 It is impossible to conceive of any justification for 
de jure discrimination on the basis of race, but the idea of common but 
differentiated responsibility under socioeconomic legislation may very 
well justify distinctions based on property. In other words, the exact 
standard of justification should depend on the specific ground of discrim-
ination at issue. The more a distinction jeopardizes the recognition of 
fundamental rights, the more demanding the scrutiny of its “reasonable-
ness.” As explained, this is a common theme in constitutional jurispru-
dence.179 For instance, the use of the term “suspect classification” in U.S. 
equal protection analysis reflects the understanding that certain distinc-
tions, such as race, are not acceptable and, therefore, presumptively 
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invalid.180 A high threshold of justification and a particularly careful 
analysis is required in such cases.181 
This balancing approach can also be recognized in international case 
law. According to the European Court of Human Rights, discrimination 
on the basis of race or ethnicity is particularly invidious, and, therefore, 
no difference in treatment will be justified if it is based exclusively on 
those immutable traits.182 
A heightened level of justification is also usually sought with respect 
to gender discrimination. The Human Rights Committee explained in 
Müller and Engelhard v. Namibia183 that differential treatment based on 
gender “places a heavy burden on the State party to explain the reason 
for the differentiation.”184 The European Court of Human Rights asks for 
“very weighty reasons” as well when it comes to gender discrimina-
tion.185 
However, in cases involving distinctions based on property—i.e., purely 
economic distinctions—the Committee’s analysis should be more  
deferential.186 The Committee should follow Yuji Iwasawa’s approach—
explained in Iwasawa’s dissenting opinion in the Haraldsson case—and 
state actors should be afforded wide latitude in devising economic regu-
latory policies.187 Such government action should not be found imper-
                                                                                                             
 180. For a critical evaluation of the “per se” test and the “color blindness” theory, see 
Sadurski, supra note 115, at 74–84. 
 181. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra 
note 8, at 25–26. 
 182. D.H. v. Czech Republic, App. Co. 57325/00, (2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/ 
echr/Homepage_EN. 
 183. Müller and Engelhard v. Namibia (Communication No. 919/2000), reprinted in 
Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 243, U.N. Doc. No. 
A/57/40 (Jan. 1, 2002). 
 184. Id. at. 243, para. 6.7. 
 185. Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 
at 31–32 (1985). This high standard of review is also applied to treatment based exclu-
sively on the ground of nationality. See Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 
1129. 
 186. For example, in the case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of 
Languages in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium, the European Court of Human Rights 
applied a low standard of review by requiring a “reasonable relationship of proportionali-
ty.” Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education 
in Belgium” v. Belgium (No. 2), 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 31 (1968); see also Swedish 
Engine Drivers’ Union, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 14 (1976) (noting that differential 
treatment may be justified by a legitimate aim). See generally, J.H. GERARDS, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN EQUAL TREATMENT CASES (2005). 
 187. Committee member Iwasawa explained that, “[s]tates should be allowed wider 
discretion in devising regulatory policies in economic areas. . . . The Committee should 
be mindful of its own expertise in reviewing economic policies that had been formed 
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missible under Article 26 under the rubric of unfairness. This was also 
the position of Committee member Sir Nigel Rodley, who recognized the 
insufficient capacity of an international body to master the issues at stake 
in economic regulations and, therefore, conceded deference to the State 
party’s arguments.188 It is telling that, even under the most stringent  
domestic law standard of review, deference is still given to the legislature 
when it comes to purely economic matters.189 As mentioned above, under 
the “new formula” of the German Federal Constitutional Court, a more 
lenient standard of review is exercised in these matters.190 Distinctions 
neither based on discriminatory grounds nor deemed to affect a funda-
mental right are tested only for manifest inappropriateness.191 In this  
respect, German jurisprudence is similar to that of many other jurisdic-
tions. A comparison of domestic constitutional jurisprudence reveals that 
distinctions involving purely economic matters are usually upheld.192 
It is difficult to understand why international human rights protection 
should go further in developing overly stringent standards of equal pro-
tection scrutiny. Presumably, this is due to a misunderstanding of the 
term “reasonable,” which is inherently vague. The Human Rights Com-
mittee should therefore enhance its doctrinal understanding of Article 26 
with a focus on refining the term “reasonable” as used in nondiscrimina-
tion analysis, in order to ultimately differentiate its analytical approach 
according to the intensity with which unequal treatment affects funda-
mental rights.193 
                                                                                                             
carefully through the democratic process.” Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, at 
25–26. 
 188. Id. at 24; see also, Sadurski, supra note 115, at 72 (stating that “the ideal of equal-
ity in the law is narrower and more specific than an ideal of overall justness.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 144 (1944). 
 190. Eberle, supra note 106, at 2100. 
 191. The “new formula” only provides for a more stringent standard of review if basic 
rights are affected and if discrimination is based on grounds similar to those listed in 
Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Constitution. Apart from this, an arbitrariness test is applied. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 7, 1980, 55 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 72 (89) (F.R.G.). The regula-
tion at issue in Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland would not be invalidated on the basis 
of equal protection. For the jurisprudence under the “new formula” in general, see Sachs, 
supra note 120, at 15253. 
 192. Baer, supra note 116, at 257. 
 193. This does not duplicate the fundamental rights analysis. Equal protection becomes 
relevant if the analysis reveals that there has not been a violation. This is particularly 
relevant in cases in which a State party goes beyond the standards of the Covenant and 
makes distinctions between different groups of people. 
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2. Standards of Review or a Sliding Scale? 
By standardizing the review according to the severity of the discrimi-
nation—an approach comparable to that of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which distinguishes between suspect, quasi-suspect, and other classifica-
tions194—the Committee could generate a more coherent equal protection 
doctrine. The respective standards would each specify permissible aims, 
as well as the proper means-to-ends relationship. The U.S. standard of 
review ranges from “strict scrutiny” to deferential “rational basis” re-
view: strict scrutiny review applies to suspect classifications and in-
fringements of fundamental rights;195 intermediate scrutiny applies to 
quasi-suspect classifications;196 and rational basis review applies to non-
suspect classifications.197 Under strict scrutiny review, statutory distinc-
tions based on race and alienage can only pass muster if they serve a 
compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored to achieve that desig-
nated interest.198 The intermediate standard of review—applied, for  
example, to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy—requires a 
substantial connection between the classification and an important gov-
ernment objective.199 And rational basis review—the least rigorous stan-
dard, which applies to nonsuspect distinctions such as economic status—
requires merely that the given statutory means be rationally related to the 
achievement of a legitimate legislative aim.200 
                                                                                                             
 194. This approach has not gone unchallenged in the United States. For example,  
Justice Thurgood Marshall advocated a “sliding scale” methodology, which entails that 
the intensity of judicial review should vary depending on the value of the particular inter-
est or individual right affected and the importance of the legislative goal. Mass. Bd. of 
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 195. The fundamental rights analysis is applied to cases involving the right to family 
relations, procreation, vote and travel. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Va. 
Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 196. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The Court has also indicated that a 
less lenient standard of rationality review might be applied for instances of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, illegitimacy, and mental illness. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620 (1996); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Trimble v. 
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977). 
 197. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427 
U.S. at 307; Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ry. Express Agency 
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
 198. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 199. ‘Important’ means that a purpose needs to be less than compelling but more than 
legitimate, where as ‘substantial’ means that the classification must be more than reason-
able but less than the almost perfect fit between ends and means, which is required for 
suspect classifications. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 190. 
 200. See Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1944). 
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The advantage of this approach—as compared to proportionality  
analysis or the sliding scale method pursued by Continental European 
courts and the European Court of Human Rights201—is standardization. It 
arguably renders judicial outcomes more predictable and perhaps even 
more rational.202 The flexible standards and the case-by-case approach 
found in the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights case law have been criticized as lacking doctrinal 
coherence and predictability and leaving too much room for judicial  
value judgments.203 On the other hand, a certain degree of subjectivity 
will always exist with any method of nondiscrimination analysis.204 Even 
in the United States, the questions of whether a classification is suspect 
or quasi-suspect, and whether a classification serves an important objec-
tive, both require judgments of value.205 Further, what may seem to be a 
standardized level of scrutiny may vary in its application to individual 
cases.206 In practice and implementation, the difference between the  
European sliding scale approach and the U.S. standard of review  
approach is almost insignificant. Even though the European approach 
lacks formally standardized levels of scrutiny, the jurisprudence of these 
Courts effectively reflects varying degrees of scrutiny depending on the 
nature of the discrimination and its implications. The outcomes of equal 
protection cases in European domestic courts shows that distinctions 
which impinge on the exercise of fundamental rights have a much harder 
                                                                                                             
 201. See Christian Walter, Gleichheit und Rationalität, in GLEICHHEIT UND 
NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTS-
SCHUTZ 253, 258–62 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003). 
 202. See Partsch, supra note 98, at 69. 
 203. See, Alexander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the 
Second Germanization of American Equal Protection Review, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 284 
(1998) (comparing the German Constitutional Court’s analysis with the U.S. Supreme 
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quires an evaluation of socio-cultural elements, traditions, and mentalities. Pierre-Marie 
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SCHUTZ  149, 154 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003). 
 205. Donal P. Kommers & Stephanie E. Niehaus, An Introduction to American Equal 
Protection Law, in GLEICHHEIT UND NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND 
INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 25, 38–39 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003). 
 206. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of 
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006); see also, Louis D. 
Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481 (2002). 
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time surviving judicial scrutiny than discrimination based on purely eco-
nomic categories.207 
The difference between the two approaches should not be overstated. If 
European scrutiny is more demanding in some areas, it is not due to a 
difference of method. Rather, the variance is more appropriately attribut-
able to different value judgments with respect to the invidiousness of a 
classification. German jurisprudence, for example, is concerned with the 
protection of vulnerable groups more generally and tends to exhibit a 
different understanding of the role of the judiciary in shielding those 
groups from what it perceives as harmful.208 
What is important is that domestic and international courts realize that 
the degree of their review must correspond to the invidiousness of the 
discriminatory classification. As such, regardless of whether the Com-
mittee adopts a variable proportionality analysis or a standardized test, it 
will need to fine-tune its analysis. In practice, the Committee has already 
applied the “reasonable” test with varying intensity.209 A close look at the 
Committee’s reasoning in particular cases shows that the standards of 
justification have indeed varied.210 While a more lenient approach origi-
nally dominated judicial review of socioeconomic legislation, such that a 
number of regulatory distinctions were upheld, more recent cases trend 
toward increasing demands for justification, even when no fundamental 
rights are at stake.211 The Committee should re-evaluate this trend and 
take note of the varying standards it has applied in earlier cases. In order 
to develop a balanced and consistent approach, it is high time to ac-
knowledge the underlying rationale of equal protection and to structure 
equal protection analysis accordingly.  
Even if the Committee is not willing to develop a standardized test for 
different categories of discrimination, the Committee must define the 
contours of the “reasonableness” test, and, in doing so, must acknowl-
edge that it is in fact utilizing a proportionality review in order to deter-
mine what is reasonable. As a matter of transparency, the Committee 
should specify what aims are permissible, clarify the means-to-ends  
relationship, and note that the standards will vary depending on the na-
                                                                                                             
 207. Baer, supra note 116, at 260. 
 208. Id. at 256. Judicial self-restraint is not a common theme of European constitutio-
nalism. 
 209. See cases cited supra note 6. 
 210. The Committee usually engaged in an intermediate standard of review, standing 
somewhere between basic rationality and strict scrutiny. See cases cited supra note 6. 
 211. See Ando, supra note 3, at 213–22 (detailing accounts of relevant cases). 
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ture of the discriminatory distinctions at issue.212 After all, the more a 
distinction or its implications affect a fundamental human right, the more 
rigorous the justification requirements for permissible state interests and 
for the means-to-ends relationship. Finally, with respect to economic 
matters, a deferential approach should be applied across the board. 
CONCLUSION 
Article 26 of the ICCPR comprises two elements of equality: equality 
before the law (i.e., formal equality); and the principle of nondiscrimina-
tion (i.e., substantive equality of the law).213 In order to inject real mean-
ing into the concept of equal protection, it is necessary to focus on the 
enumerated grounds of impermissible discrimination as set forth therein. 
The nondiscrimination rule renders the abstract notion of equality more 
concrete because it indicates the criteria by which equality should be 
granted; however, Article 26 does not provide for a principle of general 
equality that supersedes the nondiscrimination grounds. The emphasis on 
nondiscrimination is also the predominant approach in domestic constitu-
tional law across a number of jurisdictions. The structural parallels of 
equal protection rules in international human rights instruments and  
national constitutions imply that comparative constitutional analysis is a 
valuable tool for evaluating the meaning of the international nondiscri-
mination principle. After all, equal protection rules are based in the same 
historical preoccupation with harnessing the control of State power in the 
interest of protecting human rights.214 International equal protection is 
thus yet another field in which comparative constitutional law can play a 
significant role, and a shift toward such analysis offers mutual benefit for 
all involved. 
Thus far, the discussion in the United States has centered on the ques-
tion of whether comparative constitutional analysis is a permissible tool 
in the interpretation of national constitutional law.215 However, it is not 
only domestic constitutional jurisprudence that stands to benefit from a 
                                                                                                             
 212. This appears to be implicit in the Committee’s evaluation of whether a regulation 
is reasonable. 
 213. Unfortunately, General Comment No. 18 already seems to depart from the  
assumption that Article 26 comprises three elements: equality before the law, equal pro-
tection of the law, and nondiscrimination. See General Comment No. 18, supra note 6, ¶ 
12. However, the discrimination principle is essentially a negative formulation of equal 
protection of the law. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 607–608. 
 214. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 598. 
 215. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). But see, id. at 598 (Sca-
lia, J., dissenting). 
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consideration of the reflections of foreign and international institutions. 
International jurisprudence can also take advantage of domestic constitu-
tional interpretation, including the long standing experience of the U.S. 
Supreme Court and other constitutional courts worldwide. This is partic-
ularly true with respect to equal protection analysis, given that it is a rela-
tively new area of international law. Current trends in the interpretation 
of the universal nondiscrimination principle seem, unfortunately, to lose 
track of the theoretical underpinnings of equal protection analysis. There 
is an urgent need for re-conceptualization, but this requires an effort by 
all those working in this field of law. 
Instead of continuing to criticize the Committee for applying Article 26 
to non-Conventional rights, international law scholars and practitioners 
should join in the development of a sound jurisprudential approach. 
Drawing from a comparative analysis, this Article has attempted to  
provide suggestions for the future realization of an international equal 
protection framework. The Human Rights Committee should heed these 
suggestions and, rather than extend the grounds of nondiscrimination 
further, should instead allow a wider margin of deference to State parties 
where less serious distinctions are being made. The Committee should be 
confident that it is not its responsibility to venture into notions of general 
equality. To interpret Article 26 as a principle of general equality, requir-
ing sound and persuasive grounds for any kind of distinction, is not in the 
interest of international human rights. The purpose of human rights 
norms is to set basic standards for the enjoyment of fundamental rights 
and freedoms, not to unduly limit legislative discretionary power by pro-
viding a judicially prescribed model for legislation.216 
Whether legislation is generally reasonable largely depends on value 
judgments that vary from nation to nation. What may be considered  
unreasonable in western societies may have a reasonable explanation in 
other settings. If equal protection on the international level is to be  
regarded as a general measure in assessing the reasonableness of legisla-
tion, it would most certainly run into the trap of cultural imperialism. In 
order to avoid such criticism, it is necessary to concentrate on universal 
values. Fortunately, the grounds of nondiscrimination spelled out in  
Article 26 stand for a universal consensus that discrimination based on 
certain classifications cannot be tolerated.217 A stronger focus on the  
specified grounds of nondiscrimination would guide equal protection 
                                                                                                             
 216. This is why it is not appropriate to apply the German equal protection model as a 
structural element of constitutional law at the international level. 
 217. Compare ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26, with discussion supra Part II.A. 
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analysis along these well tread lines and help to reemphasize the validity 
of Article 26 as a truly international human rights instrument. 
The suggestions presented herein are not only relevant for the interpre-
tation of Article 26 of the ICCPR, but also for the future of international 
equal protection more generally. For example, interpretation of the paral-
lel provisions in the American Convention on Human Rights218 and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights may well benefit from 
this discussion.219 With Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms having  
entered into force in 2005, the European Court of Human Rights is also 
about to deal with similar questions.220 The trials and errors of its coun-
terparts can help the Court develop a thoughtful and reasoned approach 
to this issue.221 If only one lesson is to be passed on, let it be that the 
principle of equal protection should not be misunderstood as a principle 
of general equality. Rather, the principle of equal protection should be 
afforded a narrow nuanced interpretation, such that it may be rendered a 
truly universal principle. 
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Ser./L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 31 (2001); see also Thomas Buergenthal, Nondiscrimina-
tion and Equal Protection in the Inter-American System, in GLEICHHEIT UND 
NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTS-
SCHUTZ 161, 161–70 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003) (providing an overview of the non-
discrimination and equal protection doctrines under article 1, parargraph 1 and article 24 
of the American Convention). 
 219. The African Charter provides for a broad principle of equality before the law 
without specifying the forbidden grounds of discrimination. African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, concluded June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, art. 3; see also 
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 220. See generally European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
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considered international human rights standards across all nations, without infringing 
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